

系 所 組 別	考 試 科 目
行政管理學系	英文

考生請於答案卷內作答

一、翻譯題(每小題二十五分，50%)

1. We have been bludgeoned into accepting as gospel that to speak of the common good is either propaganda or false consciousness. The attacks on the common good have come from all ideological quarters. Liberal pluralists see only a diversity of group interest striking temporary bargains in the political arena. Marxists argue on roughly similar grounds that the “common good” is merely a phrase invoked by the bourgeois ruling class, to hide purposes that are nothing other than an expression of their own class interest. Postmodern critics who see only a world of fleeting kaleidoscopic images, dissolve the “common good” into a thousand discursive fragments, dismissing attempts to raise any one of them above the rest as an unjustifiable attempt to establish a new “metanarrative” in an age from which metanarratives have been banned.

2. Communitarianism reproduces the functionalist and corporatist argument that social order depends on the creation of a consensus over the legitimacy of the political institutions governing it. Functionalists often classify organizations as, say, coercive, remunerative, or normative, according to the main mechanisms, by which they maintain social control and the corresponding functions they fulfill for their members. In this scheme, coercive organizations have to ensure compliance through force because the people within them tend to resist: remunerative organizations get individuals to conform to their norms by paying them so to do; and normative organizations manufacture suitable conformity out of the feeling of obligation and commonality of their members, who join them to pursue goals they believe to be morally worthwhile.

二、請仔細閱讀以下幾段文字，試以中文說明(非翻譯)其內容大要，並對此段文字，從民主程序、官僚行為與國際組織等觀點，以英文提出個人看法(50%)

Scholars studying democratization, especially in the developing world, have worried that the use of democratic procedures will outstrip the spread of liberal values,

creating “illiberal democracies” at the national level. At the global level, we see the opposite problem: international organizations (IOs) often use undemocratic procedures in the pursuit of liberal values, thus creating “undemocratic liberalism” in global governance. Global governance is legitimated by its pursuit of liberal goals-human rights, growth through markets. Yet international organizations are unabashedly undemocratic, and procedures for consent of the governed are very weak. Harmonizing the substantively liberal goals of these organizations with procedures that, if not democratic, at least provide some accountability and representation will be an ongoing task that is essential to the long-term legitimacy of global governance.

If scholars of international organizations have not been particularly concerned with undemocratic, unrepresentative, and unaccountable features of IOs it is because their theoretical lenses have until recently viewed IOs as a progressive and liberal force in a dangerous, largely illiberal, world. Given such dispositions the concern for many scholars and policymakers has been not the oversupply but rather the undersupply of international organizations. Most approaches to the study of international cooperation and global governance look to create international institutions as solutions to the world’s problems. Institutions are the singular answer to promoting interdependence and solving the myriad of collective action problems in environmental, economic, and security affairs because they offer rational, impersonal, and nonviolent means of dealing with conflict and enable states to overcome narrow self-interest and achieve long-term cooperation. They also are valued because of the view that they help to bring about progress, nurturing development, security, justice, and individual autonomy.

Yet the liberalizing and rationalizing processes associated with global bureaucratization might come at a steep price. One hundred years ago Max Weber observed that Prussia was becoming bureaucratic. He welcomed this development, recognizing that it would enable an increasingly complex society to coordinate its activities in a more rational, objective, and peaceful manner. He was further heartened by the realization that the bureaucracy was helping to inculcate in his fellow citizens the rational values that he prized. But he also recognized that a bureaucratic world had its own perils, producing increasingly powerful and autonomous bureaucrats who could be “spiritless” and driven by rules, who could apply those rules in ways that harmed the people whom they were expected to serve, thus creating an “iron cage.” Weber understood that the very bureaucracy that was needed to keep a society democratic, prosperous, and healthy might also undermine society’s well-being.

What Weber observed at the beginning of the past century at the domestic level we

observe at the beginning of this new century at the domestic level we observe at the beginning of this new century at the global level. States have built panoply of international and regional organizations that are intended to help them facilitate interdependence and manage its excesses. Without international organizations, states and peoples would be less able to reap the fruits of commercial exchange, find nonviolent dispute mechanisms, and solve their environmental problems. International organizations are not only helping states and nonstate actors coordinate their activities and promote their interests, however. They are also shaping which activities the international community values and holds in high esteem. Beginning in the nineteenth century and continuing into the twenty-first, international organizations have been disseminating the liberal values that are the foundations for a global liberal culture. But the very source of their power to do good might also be the source of their power to do harm, to run roughshod over the interests of states and citizens that they are supposed to further. Managing our global bureaucracy and learning to exploit its strengths while moderating its failings will be and an essential task.